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Abstract: This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the 
reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action 
of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this 
sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The 
paper argues for this conclusion by examining uses of the idea of an extended unit of action in 
four theoretical contexts. It also explains why the idea of an extended unit of action need not 
involve magical thinking, and discusses possible replies to an objection based on a worry about 
recklessness. 
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One concept of joint action is of an action composed of parts such that the reasons to 
perform each part depend on the qualities of the whole. For example, electing the 
government might be considered a joint action in this sense, because it might be thought 
that each government-supporting voter’s reason for casting her vote depends on the 
effects of the election as a whole. The crucial idea here is that the focus of our attention 
should be on the part-whole relationship—not any cause-effect relationship—between the 
individual vote and the election. On this way of thinking of each voter’s action, the 
reason to perform it is not that it causes the election of the government, but that it is part 
of the election of the government. I will explain further below what difference this makes. 
 This concept of joint action—which I shall refer to as the idea of an extended unit 
of action—is a component of some much richer concepts of joint action. But in itself it is a 
surprisingly minimal idea, or so I shall argue in this paper. Few conditions must be 
satisfied for individual actions to be related in such a way that the reasons for each may 
depend on the qualities of the whole pattern of action of which they are parts. The agents 
concerned needn’t share any goals, or be willing or intending to cooperate with each 
other, for example. 
 Like other concepts of joint action, the idea of an extended unit of action can 
feature in claims about normative reasons for action as well as in claims about the 
reasons that explain why an agent acted as she did. These uses are not wholly 
independent of each other. Arguably, the explanatory claims are in good order only if the 
idea of normative reasons based on an extended unit of action makes sense.1 In this 
                                                      
1 Sugden (2000: 191) disagrees. I do not mean to deny that agents sometimes act for reasons that are not 
genuine normative reasons. The suggestion instead is that a form of explanation of action—for example, in 
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respect, perhaps, the normative applications of the idea are more basic. In any case, my 
focus in this paper will be on the idea that an agent could have normative reasons for 
action associated with an extended unit of action. 
My method will be to survey several different contexts in which the idea of an 
extended unit of action has been deployed within philosophy and allied disciplines. 
Discussions within each context tend to operate largely in isolation from each other. 
Pointing out the common elements at work in each may help us to keep an open mind 
about what is involved in the idea of an extended unit of action, since what appears to be 
an obvious requirement in one context may not appear so obvious in another context. 
The result of keeping this open mind, I will claim, is the conclusion that we should not 
build much into the concept. None of this, of course, is meant to deny that there are other 
concepts of joint action which are much richer and have more demanding conditions. 
Section 1 clarifies the idea of an extended unit of action, by contrasting it with 
more standard ways of thinking about reasons for action. Section 2 surveys some uses of 
the idea of an extended unit of action in four distinct theoretical contexts. Section 3 
defends the minimal version of the idea as I have outlined it from two objections: first, 
the objection that it involves magical thinking; and second, the objection that it involves 
a kind of recklessness. Section 4 concludes. Throughout, I’ll use the phrase ‘the actor’ to 
refer to the individual agent whose normative reasons for action are under discussion. 
 
1. The idea of an extended unit of action 
 
The phrase ‘unit of action’ is a term of art. I will use it as follows: 
 
Unit of action The extent of action whose qualities (goodness, rightness) provide 
reasons for or against performing some action A.2 
 
The purpose of defining this concept is to draw attention to a common but contestable 
assumption about reasons for action, which is that the unit of action is always identical to 
the actor’s options. If we make this assumption, we think that reasons for or against an 
option A are always provided by the goodness of rightness of A itself (in comparison with 
the goodness or rightness of her other options, perhaps). This assumption might be 
correct. However, we should consider the possibility that it is not, and that, as I will put 
                                                                                                                                                            
terms of the idea of an extended unit of action—makes sense only if the normative ideas used in the 
explanation are intelligible. Admittedly, the threshold of intelligibility may be rather low. For empirical 
evidence that people use ‘team reasoning’, see Colman et. al. (2008). 
2 In Woodard (2008b: 63) I defined the idea with respect to ‘the deliberative stance’. For present purposes, 
the definition I have given in the text is more appropriate (though the two definitions, properly understood, 
express the same idea). 
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it, the unit of action extends beyond the actor’s options. For short, I will call this the idea of 
an extended unit of action. 
This idea implies that there can be a reason for or against some action, A, because 
it is part of some larger pattern of action, P, which is good or right. As I shall sometimes 
say, it is the idea that there are pattern-based reasons (Woodard 2008b). Such reasons 
exist, if at all, because A is a part of P, regardless of whether it is a cause of P (Hurley 
1989: 148). That is, the idea is not that there is a reason to perform A because it will bring 
about P, or make P more likely. Instead it is that the goodness or rightness of P provides 
reasons to perform its parts, just in virtue of their being parts of it. There may of course 
be constraints on which patterns of action can support such reasons—eligibility constraints, 
as I’ll call them. Some of these may have to do with the prospects of the larger pattern 
being realised. But the crucial point for now is that the idea of pattern-based reasons is 
not the commonplace idea that there can be a reason to do something because it will lead 
to some sequence of actions that is good or right. As we’ll see shortly, evaluating reasons 
in terms of an extended unit of action in fact involves suspending our usual predictive 
stance towards parts of the actor’s environment. This is a puzzling feature of the idea, 
which I shall try to explain. 
 How, in principle, could it turn out that the unit of action extends beyond the 
actor’s options in some cases? One idea is that this could be so only if the actor could 
participate in some larger exercise of agency. For example, suppose that genuinely joint 
actions are possible.3 One might then think that the actor could have a reason associated 
with the goodness or rightness of any joint actions in which she could participate. If she 
could participate in electing the government, for example, and we think that this would 
be a genuine exercise of joint agency, then we might think that she could have a reason 
for or against casting her individual vote that depends on the qualities of the joint action. 
That would be an instance of an extended unit of action due to the prospect of an 
exercise of extended agency. 
According to what I’ll call the mirroring assumption, this is the only way in which 
the unit of action could be extended. This assumption claims that the unit of action 
always matches, and is determined by, the unit of agency.4 This implies that there could 
be a reason to perform A because it is part of pattern P only if there is a prospect of an 
                                                      
3 An action is ‘genuinely joint’ only if it is, or would be, performed by a genuinely extended agent. This claim 
is deliberately schematic, doing no more than connecting the two concepts of joint action and extended 
agency; in particular, it does not tell us what is required for either genuine joint action or for genuinely 
extended agency. I use these terms as placeholders to help characterize the idea of the mirroring assumption. 
This assumption is general: it can be combined with many different (and rival) views about the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of extended agency or of joint action. 
4 I learned the concept of what I call the ‘unit of action’ from Susan Hurley. She tended to use the phrase 
‘unit of agency’ instead to describe this concept (1989: 145-148). This usage has been somewhat influential. 
However, I prefer ‘unit of action’ because it makes it easier to see that the mirroring assumption is a 
substantive thesis. In later work (e.g. 2005), Hurley used the phrase ‘unit of activity’. 
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extended agent performing P. So, the actor could have a pattern-based reason to play her 
part in some good joint action only if there is a prospect of the relevant group 
constituting an agent and performing that joint action. In this way the mirroring 
assumption embeds the idea of an extended unit of action within the idea of extended 
agency. 
However plausible the mirroring assumption may seem, it is not a logical 
requirement of the idea of an extended unit of action itself. The concept of the unit of 
action refers to the idea of an extent of action. If we suppose that the unit of action is 
extended, this means that the relevant extent of action includes actions other than the 
actor’s immediate options. But it does not follow from this idea that the actions which 
constitute the unit of action must be, as it were, fused together in a single exercise of 
agency (as the mirroring assumption claims). That is a further, substantive, controversial 
idea. 
So there are two conditions under which the unit of action could be extended 
beyond the actor’s immediate options. First, there might be a prospect of genuine 
extended agency, in which the actor’s options play some part. This is consistent with the 
mirroring assumption. Second, however, the mirroring assumption might be false, in 
which case there need not be any prospect of extended agency. In §2 we will see some 
examples of uses of the idea of an extended unit of action which adopt the mirroring 
assumption, and some which do not. One purpose of the discussion is to highlight the 
importance and contestability of this assumption. 
 Thus the bare idea of an extended unit of action (or of pattern-based reasons) is 
compatible with, but does not presuppose, the idea that there can be units of agency other 
than individuals. It does presuppose that the larger pattern, P, is performable in some 
sense. But that could be merely a matter of each of its parts being performable. 
 We can now characterise more precisely the standard view of reasons for action, 
from which the idea of pattern-based reasons is a departure. According to this view, the 
unit of action is always identical to the action in which we’re interested. If we’re 
interested in the reasons for or against A, the unit of action is A itself, according to the 
standard view. Thus we can call the reasons that exist according to this view act-based 
reasons. Now, it is worth pointing out that there can be act-based reasons for participating 
in patterns of action. So the advocate of the standard view is not committed to the 
implausible claim that individuals never have normative reasons for cooperating, or for 
sticking to plans, for example. However, these reasons must depend on the goodness or 
rightness of the individual acts of participation themselves. Roughly, this means that 
there is a reason to participate in a good larger pattern because of its goodness only if 
doing so raises the probability of the realisation of that pattern. Perhaps doing so 
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encourages others to participate, for example, or in some other way makes it more likely 
that the pattern will be realised. 
 To see what is distinctive about the idea of pattern-based reasons for 
participation, let us consider a specific example. Suppose we’re interested in Art’s 
reasons for action. His problem is whether to go to the café or the park for lunch. He’d 
prefer meeting Susie to not doing so, and meeting her in the park to meeting her in the 
café. She has the same preferences, mutatis mutandis. Unfortunately, neither can 
remember the arrangement they made, and they have no way of communicating. All 
these facts are common knowledge amongst them. 
 According to the standard view, Art’s reasons depend on the goodness or 
rightness of each of his options, namely café and park. Let’s assume that neither of these 
options is intrinsically right or wrong; so we’re interested only in their goodness. The 
goodness of each of them depends on Susie’s choice. If she chooses café, Art does best to 
choose café too. If she chooses park, on the other hand, he does best to choose park. If he 
has a credible prediction of her choice he may be able to settle on one of these options. 
However, the symmetry of their situation may make this difficult. His prediction 
is likely to depend on Susie’s reasons, if she is rational. If it is based entirely on an 
assessment of her reasons, as in game theory, then he is locked in a circle, since his 
reason to choose one option rather than the other depends on her reason to do likewise, 
and her situation is exactly symmetrical to his (Hurley 1989: 154-155; Regan 1980: 
Chapter 2; Sugden 2000: 179-181). Thus game theory may suffer from a problem of 
indeterminacy in simple coordination problems such as this.5 
 Now suppose that we claim that the unit of action for Art’s choice between café 
and park includes not just his behaviour but Susie’s. (Shelve for the moment any concerns 
about the rationale for doing this; we’re just trying to see what’s involved in the idea.) 
This means that we consider the rightness or goodness of the various possible 
combinations of choices they could make. Once again we can assume that no 
combination is intrinsically right or wrong, so that we have only their goodness to 
consider. Of the possible combinations, both choosing park is, they both agree, the best. 
Thus (assuming Art’s reasons in this case depend on his preferences) we may say that Art 
has a pattern-based reason to choose park, since that is his part in the best pattern of 
action that he and Susie could perform. 
 Note the following two very important points about this train of thought. The 
first is that there is no danger of falling into the circle that orthodox game theory can find 
                                                      
5 Note that this is not endemic to all theories of rationality that conform to the standard view, since there 
could be some different basis for the prediction of the other agent’s behaviour, such as salience (Schelling 
1980: Ch. 3). 
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itself trapped in, since Art’s reasons are not said to depend on Susie’s reasons. Art’s 
reasons depend instead on what it would be best for them both to do (as do her reasons). This 
is part of the attraction of the idea of an extended unit of action. However, the second 
point highlights a possibly troubling feature of the idea, while explaining the first point. 
The reason that there is no danger of falling into the circle is that Art’s reasons are not 
said to depend on how Susie would react to his choice. The circle arises when we say that one 
agent’s reasons depend on how another agent would react, and our prediction of that 
reaction depends on assessing the second agent’s reasons, in cases where those reasons 
are symmetrical to the first agent’s reasons (Sugden 2000: 191). It’s obvious that we can 
avoid this at the first step, by denying that the first agent’s reasons depend on how the 
second agent would react. But many find that an absurd claim, and this explains most of 
the resistance to the idea of an extended unit of action. 
 So the idea of an extended unit of action is equivalent to the idea that there can 
be pattern-based reasons. Just by itself, this idea does not require that the larger pattern 
would be performed if the actor plays her part in it. As we have just noted, in fact, the 
idea shifts our attention away from the question of whether the other parts of the larger 
pattern would be performed (in response to the actor’s part) altogether. Instead, what 
matters is whether the whole pattern could be performed and would be good or right. This 
displacement of our usual predictive stance towards the way the actor’s environment 
would respond to her action is puzzling, and gives rise to the main objections to the idea 
of an extended unit of action. 
I will consider these objections in §3, having first illustrated some ways in which 
the idea of an extended unit of action has been employed, in §2. 
 
 
2.  Four contexts in which the idea is used 
 
2.1 One important context in which we find the idea of an extended unit of action is 
in debates about the foundations of game theory and decision theory. Orthodox views in 
these areas define rational action in terms of the consequences of the various individual 
actions open to the actor.6 That is, they conform to what I have called the standard view 
of reasons for action, and claim that reasons are always act-based. As is well known, 
however, these accounts of rationality face various difficulties in certain collective action 
problems and their intrapersonal analogues, and this has led some theorists to propose 
                                                      
6 Of course there is an important difference between expected and actual consequences. But since this issue is 
orthogonal to those discussed in this paper, I will ignore it. 
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revised accounts of rationality incorporating use of extended units of action (Bacharach 
2006; Gold and Sugden 2007; McClennen 1985, 1990). 
 The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is probably the best-known example of a collective 
action problem. Consider the two-player, one-shot version of this game shown in Figure 
1. 
 
 Column 
         C    D 
    C    3, 3  1, 4 
  Row 
    D    4, 1  2, 2 
 
 
Figure 1: A two-person, one-shot PD 
 
Row’s payoffs are given by the first figure in each cell, while Column’s payoffs are given 
by the second. A higher figure denotes a better payoff, by the lights of the player 
concerned. Each player faces a choice between two actions: C and D. Each player’s 
choice is causally independent of the other’s. The result of each action depends on the 
choice of the other player, in the way shown by the matrix. Thus, if both players choose 
D, the result is an outcome that each values at 2. If Row chooses D while Column 
chooses C, the result is an outcome that Row values at 4, but which Column values at 1; 
and so on.7 
 As is familiar, there is a simple and powerful argument to the effect that the 
rational choice for each player is D. First consider things from Row’s point of view. 
Suppose Column were to choose C. Then the result of Row choosing C would be worse, 
by Row’s lights, than the result of Row choosing D. Now suppose Column were to 
choose D. Again, the result of Row choosing C would be worse, by Row’s lights, than the 
result of Row choosing D. So, whatever Column chooses, Row does better to choose D. 
Choosing D is Row’s best reply, whatever Column chooses—which is to say that D is a 
dominant strategy for Row. If we consider things from Column’s point of view, the 
situation is entirely symmetrical. Once again, choosing D is dominant, since it is the best 
reply to the other’s choice, whatever that is. Plausibly, rationality requires choice of 
                                                      
7 We need not ask why each player values these outcomes in these ways. It could be a matter of self-interest, 
altruism, theology, or something else. All that is necessary is that the outcomes are valued in the ways 
shown, and depend on the players’ actions in the ways shown. 
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dominant strategies when they are available. So, plausibly, rationality requires that each 
player choose D in this case.8 
 However, the result of both players choosing D is an outcome that each values 
less than each values the result of both choosing C. That is, the result of each player 
choosing C is strongly pareto superior to the result of each player choosing D.9 Hence, doing 
the thing that rationality plausibly requires in this case leads the players away from an 
outcome that is possible and that both agree is better. This seems to be bad news: either 
for rationality itself, or for our understanding of what it requires (Colman 2003; Parfit 
1987: 53–55). 
 What, if anything, has gone wrong? One diagnosis is as follows. The concepts of 
best-reply and dominant strategy both conform to the standard view of practical reasons, 
since they make claims about the actor’s reasons based on an assessment of the difference 
some one action at a time would make, holding other actions constant. A best-reply, after 
all, is a choice that maximises the actor’s payoff given the other player’s choice. A 
strategy is dominant just in case it picks out a best-reply no matter what the other player 
chooses. Both concepts therefore examine the differences that could be made to the 
outcome by single actions.10 The argument for choosing D thus makes use of a series of 
what we might call horizontal and vertical comparisons between cells in the payoff matrix. 
Holding Row’s choices constant, it uses horizontal comparisons to examine the 
differences Column’s choices could make. Holding Column’s choices constant, it makes 
vertical comparisons to examine the differences Row’s choices could make. It may 
consider several such comparisons. What it never does is make the crucial diagonal 
comparison between the result of both players choosing D and the result of both choosing 
C. 
 The concept of pareto superiority applies to this diagonal comparison, of 
course—but pareto superiority is a guide to value, not to reasons for action. Orthodox 
game theory and decision theory use no diagonal comparisons in their claims about 
reasons, because doing so would involve violating the standard view of reasons, to which 
they are committed. If we try to derive a reason to choose C in the PD from the 
comparison of <C, C> with <D, D>, for example, we are saying that there is a reason to 
                                                      
8 Howard (1988) discusses a case in which each player can detect the other’s decision rule, and argues that it 
would be rational to choose C if each player has a rule which says roughly ‘choose C if and only if the other 
has this same rule’. He also shows that this need not involve any regress. 
9 X is weakly pareto superior to Y when some prefer X and none prefer Y. X is strongly pareto superior to Y 
when all prefer X to Y. 
10 The same is true of the concept of Nash equilibrium, and David Lewis’s concept of a ‘coordination 
equilibrium’ (1986: 14). 
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choose C because it is part of a larger unit of action that is favourable.11 This contradicts 
the standard view. 
 In light of this, some theorists propose revising the orthodox account of 
rationality in game theory and decision theory. Robert Sugden has developed an account 
of ‘Team Thinking’ which makes use of the idea of an extended unit of action. In 
Sugden’s theory, it can be rational to engage in Team Thinking when one has team-
directed attitudes and the other members of a relevant group do too, such that every 
member of the group conceives of themselves as acting as part of the team and seeks to 
maximise a shared team utility function. When those conditions are met, the actor has a 
reason to play her part in the profile of actions by the members of the group that would 
maximise the shared utility function (Bacharach 1999, 2006; Colman et. al. 2008; Gold 
and Sugden 2007; Sugden 1993: 84-89, 2000: 190-203).12 If we assume that the players in 
a PD satisfy these conditions, and that the shared utility function ranks <C, C> as 
uniquely best, then each player has a reason to choose C. In this way the theory of Team 
Thinking combines two important ideas: an extended unit of action, such that the actor’s 
reason to choose C is derived from the goodness of the profile of actions that produces 
<C, C>; and a team-level evaluation of the outcomes, such that <C, C> is ranked as best 
from the ‘team’s point of view’, as we might put it. I’ll return briefly to this second idea 
later. The resulting account of rationality helps explain intuitions about reasons for 
action not just in the PD but in a range of collective action problems (Gold and Sugden 
2007).13 
 
2.2 A more familiar context for moral philosophers might be debates about the 
structure of consequentialism. Act Consequentialism conforms to what I’ve called the 
standard view of reasons. It accounts for reasons in terms of the goodness of individual 
actions, and so claims that they are always act-based. In contrast, Rule Consequentialists 
explain reasons in terms of the goodness of widespread compliance with, or acceptance 
of, sets of rules. If the explanation is given in terms of compliance it is clear that this 
amounts to use of an extended unit of action in the sense at stake here. These forms of 
Rule Consequentialism aim to account for reasons for or against individual actions in 
                                                      
11 ‘<C, C>’ here denotes the outcome produced by both players’ choice of C. 
12 Sugden writes that ‘[n]othing in this account of team agency purports to tell people when they ought—
whether morally or rationally—to act as members of teams’ (2000: 195, emphasis in the original). One might 
interpret this as claiming that the theory of Team Thinking has no normative content at all. However, I think 
that is a mistake. The burden of Sugden’s claim seems to be, instead, that it is a mistake to think that 
rationality (or morality) requires that individuals think in team-directed ways. But the theory of Team 
Thinking remains (conditionally) normative in the following sense: it tells one what it is rational to do, if one 
has the appropriate team-directed attitudes.  
13 McClennen (1985; 1990) proposes a theory of ‘resolute choice’ which modifies decision theory by adopting 
an intrapersonally extended unit of action. This helps to explain some intuitions about rational sequential 
choice in cases that are intrapersonal analogues of collective action problems. 
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terms of the goodness or badness of widespread compliance with sets of rules. But 
compliance with a set of rules may be understood as a very extended pattern of action, 
consisting of every occurrence of compliant action. Thus these forms of Rule 
Consequentialism employ the idea of an extended unit of action (Woodard 2008a: 260). 
 Other variants of consequentialism also employ the idea of an extended unit of 
action. Collective Consequentialism explains reasons for or against individual actions in 
terms of the goodness of larger patterns of action performable by some relevant group 
(Mulgan 2001: Chs. 3-4). Plan Consequentialism explains reasons in terms of the 
goodness of a larger pattern of action performable by the actor herself (Feldman 1997; 
McClennen 1985, 1990). Cooperative Consequentialism explains reasons in terms of the 
goodness of the best pattern of action performable by all cooperative agents (Hurley 
1989: 136-159, 1991, 1994, 2005; Regan 1980). Other variants may also use the idea of 
an extended unit of action. Any so-called ‘indirect’ version of consequentialism that 
explains reasons in terms of something that amounts to a pattern of action uses this idea. 
 
2.3 Consider now a third context. There is a debate in deontic logic between so-
called ‘actualists’ and ‘possibilists’ (Bergström 1966; Goldman 1976; Jackson 1987; 
Jackson and Pargetter 1986; Sobel 1976; Zimmerman 1996: Ch. 6). These two camps 
disagree about the concept of moral obligation. Actualists claim that obligation depends 
on facts about how the actor’s environment would respond to the choices she could 
make. These facts could include facts about her own response to those choices. In one of 
the central examples, Professor Procrastinate has been invited to review a book (Jackson 
and Pargetter 1986: 235). He faces a sequence of choices. Now he must either accept or 
reject the invitation; if he accepts now, later he will face a choice between writing or not 
writing the review. The best outcome would be reached by accepting now and writing 
later. The next best outcome would be reached by declining now. The worst outcome 
would be reached by accepting now, but not writing later. Though he could accept or 
decline, and he could write or not write, as a matter of fact he would not write later, were 
he to accept now. Actualists believe that this fact about his own response to accepting the 
invitation implies that he ought to decline. Possibilists deny this, and claim that it lets 
Procrastinate off the hook too easily. They claim that what he ought to do now depends 
on how he could best respond later, not on how he would respond later. Thus, they treat 
the actor’s own response differently from the response of other parts of her environment. 
They claim that we should focus on the best response she could make, but on the response 
the rest of her environment would make. 
 The debate between actualists and possibilists is usually couched in terms which 
obscure its relevance to the idea of an extended unit of action. It tends to be described as 
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being about which consequences of an individual action matter for obligation. Actualists 
claim, of course, that it is the ‘actual’ consequences that matter—where this means the 
consequences the action would have, were it performed. Possibilists claim, in contrast, 
that ‘merely possible’ consequences matter. But note that they are interested only in 
certain very specific merely possible consequences: namely, those that would occur were 
the action in question performed, and the actor were to perform some other action she could 
perform. Possibilists are not interested in any other merely possible consequences, such as 
those that would follow were the weather different than it will be, or were some other 
agent to behave in some way he will not. Only those possible consequences that are 
accessible by some combination of actions performable by the actor are said to matter. 
 For this reason it is more perspicuous to conceive of the debate between actualists 
and possibilists as being about whether an extended unit of action, which includes only 
actions performable by the actor, generates reasons for her to act now. Rather than being 
about which consequences of individual actions matter (the ‘actual’ versus the ‘merely 
possible’), it is better to think of it as being about the relevant unit of action, the (‘actual’) 
consequences of which matter. Putting things this way explains which particular ‘merely 
possible’ consequences are the subject of the dispute, and thereby makes better sense of 
possibilist views (Jackson 1987: 106; Woodard 2009). Possibilist versions of 
consequentialism are thus best understood as versions of Plan Consequentialism.14 
 
2.4 The final context I wish to discuss is Kantian ethics. One reason to include it is to 
counteract the impression that may have been gained that the idea of an extended unit of 
action is relevant only to theories that are, in a broad sense, consequentialist. Each of the 
proposals I’ve discussed in the other three contexts used the idea of the good consequences 
of a larger unit of action to make claims about reasons to perform parts of it. But there is 
nothing essentially consequentialist about the idea of an extended unit of action. 
 Indeed, this idea may be essential in Kantian ethics. One respect in which it 
seems important is in the idea of an imperfect duty. According to Kant some duties, such 
as the duty not to lie, are perfect; others, such as the duty to develop one’s talents, are 
imperfect (Cummiskey 1996: 114-122). This contrast seems to be a matter of laxity in 
guiding individual actions. Perfect duties set strict limits, requiring certain things on 
specific occasions. For example, the perfect duty not to lie requires that, on every 
occasion in which it is possible for me to lie, I do not lie. In contrast, imperfect duties do 
                                                      
14 I do not claim that understanding possibilism as a form of Plan Consequentialism resolves all problems 
with it. There are still difficult issues about specifying what the actor could do, for example. Instead, the 
claim is that understanding it in this way explains why the possible outcomes that possibilists believe are 
relevant only ever include ones accessible by sequences of action that the actor could perform. This feature of 
possibilism is otherwise mysterious. 
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not require specific actions on specific occasions. For example, I can comply with the 
duty to develop my talents even while I am skipping the faculty research seminar to play 
a mind-numbing video game, so long as I develop my talents sufficiently on other 
occasions. Because it is imperfect, this duty does not imply that any particular action is 
forbidden or required.15 Instead, imperfect duties seem to imply that lives, or anyway 
extended periods of lives, with certain characteristics are forbidden or required. A life 
without development of one’s own talents, for example, is forbidden. Though I can skip 
the research seminar this time, I cannot pass up similar opportunities every time they 
arise—for then I would have lived an impermissible life. 
 This picture of imperfect duties suggests that the idea of an extended unit of 
action is required to explain how imperfect duties ever give rise to reasons to perform 
individual actions. If I have a reason to go to the research seminar because of the 
imperfect duty to develop my own talents, for example, that reason must have the 
following form: going to the seminar is a constituent of one of the permitted lives, of 
which I am required to live one. Thus, a reason to perform individual action A is said to 
depend on the rightness of some larger unit of action (in this case, a series of actions 
constituting a permitted life). Kantian ethics thus seems to make important use of the 
idea of an extended unit of action.16 
 
2.5 This brief survey of proposals in four contexts suggests the following points. First, 
it is clear that the idea of an extended unit of action is recurrently attractive. As I’ve said, 
each of these discussions tends to occur without much reference to any of the others. 
This suggests the following sociological speculation: the same idea somehow occurs to 
people who are interested in rationality, as being part of an attractive view for some 
purpose, more or less independently of its having occurred to others working on related 
questions in different contexts. Whether or not that speculation is true, the idea of an 
extended unit of action is certainly recurrently attractive, and I take that to be evidence 
that it merits attention. We should try to understand this idea and the issues it raises. 
 Second, the proposals fall into various types. One obvious dividing line is 
between views that limit the extended unit to the actor’s own behaviour, and those which 
allow it to extend across individuals. Possibilism, Plan Consequentialism, and Kantian 
imperfect duties use the idea for the actor’s own behaviour only. Rule Consequentialism, 
Collective Consequentialism, Cooperative Consequentialism, Team Thinking, and 
                                                      
15 There are limiting cases which complicate this story. Presumably, the duty forbids committing suicide. I 
shall set these complications aside. 
16 If Parfit (2011) is right that we can think of Kantian contractualism as converging with Rule 
Consequentialism, and I am right that Rule Consequentialism depends centrally on the idea of an extended 
unit of action, we might conceive Kant’s ethics as using this same idea more generally, not just with respect 
to imperfect duties. 
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(perhaps) other elements of Kantian ethics use the idea for other individuals’ behaviour. 
Obviously, this issue is extremely important for the character of the resulting views. A 
second dividing line is more specific. This is between views that impose specific eligibility 
constraints on the behaviour that can form part of the unit of action, and those that do 
not. Cooperative Consequentialism, for example, disallows any behaviour that is not the 
behaviour of a cooperative agent. Team Thinking requires not just cooperativeness, but 
also that every agent conceives of herself as acting as part of the team and shares the 
team-level objective. Rule Consequentialism, on the other hand, extends the unit of 
action to include the behaviour of all those capable of performing the type of action in 
question, whether or not they are cooperatively disposed or identify as part of the group 
of all such agents. Third, some views marry the idea of an extended unit of action with 
the idea of group-level evaluation, while others do not. Certainly these two ideas are 
conceptually distinct, though it might be possible to argue that the first is implausible 
without the second (Woodard 2003: 215). 
 Some of these differences might reflect different attitudes towards what I have 
called the mirroring assumption. Since this assumption tends not to be articulated, this is 
only a speculative interpretative hypothesis. However, it could help explain, for example, 
why possibilists extend the unit of action only to the actor’s own behaviour, or why 
Team Thinking requires team identification and shared team-level evaluation. In each 
case, the theorists might be presupposing the mirroring assumption, and tacitly assuming 
that the phenomena in question constitute the only examples of genuinely extended 
agency. Other proposals, such as Rule Consequentialism, clearly do not accept the 
mirroring assumption. 
 
3.  Two objections: magical thinking and recklessness 
 
In §1, I noted that the idea of an extended unit of action sometimes requires that we 
substitute a concern with what could happen in response to the actor’s actions for our 
usual concern with what would happen. In particular, it requires this substitution when 
we are considering any possible behaviour that is included in the unit of action itself. 
This was what enabled Art to coordinate with Susie, but it also invites a number of 
objections. Two of the most important are as follows. First, does this substitution rely on 
magical thinking, to the effect that the actor can control the others’ responses? Second, 
isn’t it reckless to substitute concern with how the others could respond for our usual 
concern with how they would respond? 
The first objection is that extending the unit of action to include other agents’ 
behaviour involves some sort of magical thinking (Elster 1989: 192-202). In particular, it 
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might be thought to rely on the tacit assumption that the actor has the power to 
determine what other relevant agents will choose. For example, if we suppose that Art 
has a pattern-based reason to choose park because it is part of the best pattern 
performable by him and Susie, it might be thought that we are supposing that his choice 
would bring it about that the best pattern is realised. That would amount to believing 
that, by choosing park, he could cause Susie to do the same. 
 In some specific situations this sort of control of another’s response might be 
possible. But of course it is not generally possible, which is why this sort of assumption is 
appropriately described as ‘magical thinking’. However, the idea of an extended unit of 
action is in no way committed to such thinking. Art’s pattern-based reason to choose 
park, supposing he has one, does not depend on any claim about how Susie would 
respond to that choice. As I explained above, it is supposed to follow from the fact that 
his going to the park is part of the best pattern they could perform. It thus depends on 
claims about what each of them could do. But it does not rely on any claims about what 
either of them would do. To suppose otherwise is to misunderstand the nature of the idea 
of an extended unit of action, or of pattern-based reasons. 
 Far from relying on predictions based on dubious magical thinking, pattern-based 
reasons don’t rely on predictions (about behaviour that is part of the unit of action) at all. 
Though we usually adopt a predictive stance towards the behaviour of relevant parts of 
our environment when deliberating, we suspend this stance towards behaviour that is 
part of the unit of action. The standard view of practical reasons recognises this with 
respect to the options open to the actor, of course. No-one thinks that in deliberating 
whether to choose A or ~A, I should try to predict whether I will choose A or ~A. 
Predicting other behaviour by myself might be pertinent; but predicting the very thing 
under deliberation is not. This is not because the nature of human freedom makes such 
predictions impossible. It is just because such predictions are irrelevant to the question 
being asked. In deliberating about A or ~A, I am asking myself which of these options is 
best or right. Answering ‘I will choose A’ or ‘I will choose ~A’ simply fails to address the 
question. For this reason, deliberation about a piece of behaviour ‘crowds out’ prediction 
of that piece of behaviour.17 
 The same goes for your choice of B or ~B, if that behaviour of yours is part of the 
unit of action for my choice of A or ~A. When I include your behaviour in the unit of 
action, I address myself to the goodness or rightness of the various possible combinations 
of A, ~A, B, and ~B. If that is the question I’m strictly interested in, it is irrelevant to ask 
whether you will choose B or ~B. (This is not to say that I should lose all interest in 
predicting your behaviour. For example, I might want to include your behaviour in the 
                                                      
17 The phrase—though not the explanation—is Levi’s (1997: ix). 
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unit of action only if I judge you to be cooperative (Regan 1980), which is to make a kind 
of prediction, though not of your choices. Or, as I shall suggest below, I might want 
somehow to combine concern with pattern-based reasons and concern with act-based 
reasons in a single case. If I do that, I should retain an interest in predicting your 
behaviour insofar as I am deliberating about my act-based reasons.) 
Pattern-based reasons do not depend on causal claims about the relationship 
between the part—the action for which there is said to be a reason—and the completion 
of the pattern. They depend on parthood relations, not causal relations, between the 
constituent action and the favoured pattern.18 This explains why deliberation about 
pattern-based reasons involves suspending our normal predictive stance towards all parts 
of the pattern. Because we are not asking whether the pattern would come about, but 
whether it would be good or right, it is irrelevant to predict that this or that part of it 
would or would not be performed. 
This is not always fully appreciated. Once we have cleared up this confusion, 
however, the outlook may seem worse for the idea of pattern-based reasons. One imagines 
a sceptic saying, ‘if that’s what you mean, let’s hear no more of it!’. 
 In particular, suspending the predictive stance can seem reckless. Claiming that 
there is a reason to do such and such, because this is part of a good or right pattern of 
action, without making the reason conditional on predictions about completion of the 
pattern, seems like an invitation to bring forward cases in which acting unilaterally on 
such reasons would have disastrous consequences. For example, suppose that the best 
pattern of behaviour by drivers on UK roads involves their all driving on the right hand 
side of the road (since that would minimise the risk of accidents when they drive 
elsewhere). Surely it’s crazy to claim that any individual driver in the UK has a reason to 
drive on the right, where that reason does not depend on any prediction about whether 
the others will do so too? 
 The worry about recklessness may seem unanswerable. In fact, there are at least 
four distinct ways for the advocate of pattern-based reasons to respond to it. Here I will 
simply outline these four ways, rather than defending in detail the response I think best. 
My aim is to dispel the air of indisputability in a way that does not depend on the 
reader’s attitude to my specific theoretical commitments. 
One response is to claim that pattern-based reasons exist only in specific contexts, 
where the contexts are described in ways such that acting on these reasons does not seem 
reckless. The leading version of this idea restricts pattern-based reasons to cooperative 
contexts. For example, Regan’s ‘Cooperative Utilitarianism’ bids each agent to ‘[hold] 
                                                      
18 One complication is that an individual action’s causal properties might be crucial in making it part of the 
favoured pattern. For example, an act of voting is part of the pattern electing the government only because it has 
certain causal properties. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. 
 16 
himself ready to co-operate with whoever else is willing and able to co-operate . . .  [and 
then to identify] the other co-operators and [do] his part in the best possible pattern of 
behaviour for the class of co-operators (including himself) in view of the behaviour of the 
non-cooperators’ (Regan 1980: 136). Though this is strictly speaking a claim about a 
decision procedure rather than about reasons, it would be natural for someone holding 
this view to claim also that there are no pattern-based reasons except when others are 
cooperative. 
 Of course, one must be careful to define ‘cooperative’ and ‘potential cooperator’ 
in ways that do not reintroduce the predictive stance. But this seems possible. Regan, for 
example, defines cooperativeness in terms of decision procedures. Thus, when 
deliberating using Cooperative Utilitarianism we seek to recognise others’ decisions 
procedures rather than seeking to predict their choices as such (Regan 1980: 142, 178).19 
As he says, ‘[w]hat each member of [the group of cooperators] needs to know about each 
other member . . .  is just that each other member will eventually act on the best plan as 
he (the other member) sees it when he comes to the last step [of deliberation] . . .  It is not 
necessary for one member . . .  to know what other members will do under any other 
description than this’ (Regan 1980: 142, emphasis in the original). Providing we can 
define ‘cooperative’ in some appropriate way such that we can identify cooperators 
without predicting their ultimate choices, claims about pattern-based reasons can be 
conditional on cooperativeness even though they are not conditional on predictions of 
specific behaviour. The former kind of conditionality may seem sufficient to avoid 
recklessness.20 
 A second possible response to the worry about recklessness is to adopt some 
device designed to steer agents away from disaster. Rule Consequentialists do this when 
they argue that one of the rules in the best set instructs the actor to break the other rules if 
necessary to avoid disaster (Hooker 2000: 98-99; Woodard 2008a). In normal cases, Rule 
Consequentialism claims that we each have pattern-based reasons that are unconditional 
on any facts about others’ responses. I should tell the truth even if you won’t, because of 
the good consequences of widespread truth-telling. However, Rule Consequentialists 
typically recognise that there can be unusual cases in which following rules that are 
                                                      
19 Recognition of decision procedures is a central feature of Howard’s treatment of one-shot PDs, too (1988). 
20 A variant of this first response to the worry about recklessness claims that pattern-based reasons exist only 
when all the agents involved together satisfy conditions of joint agency—which presumably include, but go 
beyond, the sort of cooperativeness that does the work in the previous proposal (Sugden 1993: 87). This is 
one way of motivating the mirroring assumption described in §1, and it may explain why some claim that the 
unit of action can be extended only intrapersonally. However, once we’ve seen the possibility of restricting 
pattern-based reasons to cooperative contexts, it’s not clear that considerations of recklessness speak in 
favour of further restriction to situations in which there is a prospect of joint agency. This further restriction 
just seems gratuitous. It’s not clear, for example, that others’ intentions to engage in a joint action with me 
further reduces the risk of my performing my part in a favoured pattern, as compared with their intentions 
simply to cooperate with me in producing the best pattern. 
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usually benign would have disastrous consequences. By permitting or requiring the agent 
to break those rules in such cases, a disaster-prevention rule ameliorates the worry about 
recklessness. The upshot is a theory with a dual stance on whether the responses others 
would make affect the actor’s reasons. In normal cases, they do not; but in cases where 
disaster looms, they do. 
 A third response to the worry about recklessness is to restrict pattern-based 
reasons to kinds of action that seem important enough for the apparent recklessness of 
performing them unilaterally not to seem a sufficient objection to doing so. This is one 
way of understanding deontological ethical theories such as Kant’s. These theories pick 
out certain kinds of action that, if universally performed, would constitute a pattern of 
action that is good or right. They then claim, of those specific actions, that one should 
perform them unilaterally, no matter which consequences may follow. In saying this, 
they are not thereby committed to general endorsement of pattern-based reasons. Only 
certain patterns of action are eligible to support reasons, and not all patterns meet that 
test. Not lying might meet it, for example, even though driving on the right hand side of the 
road does not. 
 These three kinds of response to the worry have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Elsewhere I have advocated a fourth kind of response (Woodard 2003, 
2008a, 2008b). If we are pluralists in the sense of permitting more than one unit of action 
for a single decision problem, we can claim that pattern-based reasons sometimes conflict 
with act-based reasons in a single case. This means that we can give an account of 
pattern-based reasons that is not restricted to any particular context or kind of action, 
while allowing that facts about how other agents would respond are vitally important, 
since they affect the nature and strength of possibly countervailing act-based reasons. 
This sort of structure has the advantage of being able to explain intuitions about 
conflicting reasons across a wide range of cases, and also of finding a natural home for 
facts about others’ responses. The natural home for such facts is in claims about act-based 
reasons. So long as we are pluralists, we do not have to find some surrogate device for 
avoiding recklessness. How you would respond matters to my reasons, just not to any 
pattern-based reason I have in respect of a unit of action that includes your response. But 
since such a pattern-based reason must be considered alongside my other reasons, facts 
about your response may affect its relative strength.21 
The worry about recklessness is not a knockdown argument against the idea of an 
extended unit of action. I have described four possible ways of responding to it, and there 
may well be others. Certainly, those who utilise the idea of an extended unit of action 
                                                      
21 One debt this response incurs is to give some account of how act-based and pattern-based reasons may 
interact in a single case. For discussion see Woodard (2008b: 107-118). 
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ought ultimately to have a convincing response to this worry. As things stand, it is 
reasonable to think that some such response could be developed. Given the recurrent 
attractiveness of the idea of an extended unit of action, and the fact that this idea does 
not rely on magical thinking, this strengthens the case for further debate about the 
relative merits of all of these possibilities. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
One of the many uses for the idea of joint action is in our understanding of reasons for 
action. In particular, it has seemed appealing to many of those who have studied reasons 
for action to make use of what I have called the idea of an extended unit of action, or of 
pattern-based reasons. This is the idea of a reason to perform some action because it is 
part of some larger pattern of action that is good or right. It is striking that this idea 
recurs in many theoretical contexts in which rationality is discussed. If the idea is correct, 
there is a sense in which an idea of joint action—specifically, the idea of patterns of 
action performable by many individuals—is involved in our understanding of the reasons 
that individuals have.22 
The idea of an extended unit of action stands opposed to the standard view of 
normative reasons for action, according to which these depend only on the goodness or 
rightness of each individual action. Pattern-based reasons are reasons for an action that 
depend on the goodness or rightness of some larger pattern, of which the immediate 
action is a part. They thus depend on parthood relations, not causal relations, between 
the favoured pattern and the action under consideration. 
 I suggested that the fact that this idea recurs in different contexts should make us 
interested in it. This fact is not evidence that the idea is correct, but it is evidence that it is 
worth understanding the idea well. It also suggests that there may be theoretical benefits 
in abstracting from the details of specific proposals made in one context or other, to 
consider the fundamental features of the idea as it appears across these different contexts. 
One such feature is that pattern-based reasons are not conditional on facts about whether 
the rest of the pattern would be realised. This explains why, when deliberating with some 
extended unit of action in mind, we suspend our normal predictive stance in respect of 
any behaviour that forms part of the unit. Doing this is not an instance of magical 
thinking—which would be, on the contrary, a matter of retaining the predictive stance, 
but making unjustified predictions on the supposition that the actor has the power to 
control responses to her choices. 
                                                      
22 If the mirroring assumption is correct, then the idea of an extended unit of action depends on a richer 
conception of joint action, according to which the larger pattern must be performable by an extended agent. 
However, I pointed out in §1 that the mirroring assumption is contestable. 
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 However, clarification of this point leads to a different objection. It can seem 
reckless to suspend the predictive stance. In line with my general method in this paper, I 
surveyed four different responses to this worry that could be made by advocates of 
pattern-based reasons. I did not argue for any of these responses, but merely claimed that, 
in light of their existence, the worry about recklessness should not be treated as a 
knockdown objection to the idea of an extended unit of action, and nor should advocates 
of one specific version of this idea assume that their particular response is the only 
genuine candidate. Pointing out the variety of ways of constructing a theory of pattern-
based reasons should lead those of us interested in the idea to examine the different 
possibilities more closely. Doing that might also enable us to export insights gained in 
one context to one or more of the others.23 
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